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Abstract
A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems
computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such
as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control, and bribery. Bucklin and fallback voting are
among the voting systems with the broadest resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) to control attacks.
However, only little is known about their behavior regarding manipulation and bribery attacks.
We comprehensively investigate the computational resistance of Bucklin and fallback voting for
many of the common manipulation and bribery scenarios; we also complement our discussion
by considering several campaign management problems for Bucklin and fallback.
1 Introduction
A central theme in computational social choice (see, e.g., the bookchapter by Brandt et al. [BCE13])
is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks that seek
to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control, and
bribery. In manipulation (introduced by Bartholdi et al. [BTT89, BO91] and, more generally, by
Conitzer et al. [CSL07]; see, e.g., the survey by Faliszewski and Procaccia [FP10]), voters try
to do so by casting insincere votes. In control (introduced by Bartholdi et al. [BTT92], see also
Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR07]), an election chair tries to influence the election outcome by changing
the structure of the election via adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. In bribery
(introduced by Faliszewski [FHH09]), an external agent tries to influence the election outcome
by bribing certain voters without exceeding some given budget. Since these types of influence are
often possible in principle for many voting systems, it has been studied to what extent computational
hardness can provide some kind of protection.
Bucklin and fallback voting [BS09] are among the voting systems with the broadest resis-
tance (i.e., NP-hardness1) to control attacks (see the work of Erde´lyi et al. [ER10, EPR11, EF10b,
∗This work was supported in part by DFG grant RO 1202/15-1, by a DAAD grant for a PPP project in the PROCOPE
program, by NCN grants 2012/06/M/ST1/00358, 2011/03/B/ST6/01393, and by the AGH University grant 11.11.230.015.
1Resistance to manipulative actions is most often meant to be NP-hardness in the literature. Being a worst-case
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EFRS12]).2 However, only little is known about the behavior of these two voting systems regarding
manipulation and bribery attacks; Schlotter et al. [SFE11] have studied them with respect to cam-
paign management, focusing on shift bribery and support bribery. We comprehensively investigate
the computational resistance of Bucklin and fallback voting for many of the common manipulation
and bribery scenarios. We also complement the results of Schlotter et al. [SFE11] by studying two
other campaign-management problems, namely swap bribery and extension bribery.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bucklin and Fallback Elections
An election is a pair (C,V ), where C = {c1, . . . ,cm} is a set of m candidates and V = (v1, . . . ,vn) is
a list of votes (or ballots) specifying the n voters’ preferences over the candidates in C. How these
preferences are represented depends on the voting system used. We allow voters to be weighted,
i.e., a nonnegative integer weight wi is associated with each vote vi. For example, a vote vi of a voter
with weight wi = 3 is counted as if three voters with unit weight would have cast the same ballot.
An unweighted election is the special case of a weighted election where each voter has unit weight.
A voting system is a rule for how to determine the winner(s) of a given election. Here we focus
on Bucklin and fallback voting only. Both systems use the notion of (weighted) majority threshold
in V , which is defined by maj(V ) = ⌊W/2⌋+ 1, where W = ∑ni=1 wi is the total weight of the votes
in V . In Bucklin voting, votes are linear rankings of all candidates, denoted by, e.g., c2 > c3 > c1,
which means that this voter (strictly) prefers c2 to c3 and c3 to c1. We call the top position in a vote
level 1, the next position level 2, and so on. Starting with the top position and proceeding level by
level through the votes in V , we determine the smallest level ℓ such that some candidate(s) occur(s)
in at least maj(V ) votes up to this level.3 A bit more formally, for each candidate c ∈C, the Bucklin
score of c in (C,V ), denoted by scorei(C,V )(c), is the smallest level k such that c occurs in at least
maj(V ) votes within the first k levels. Among the candidates from C with smallest Bucklin score,
say ℓ, those occurring most often up to level ℓ are the Bucklin winners. If a candidate c becomes a
Bucklin winner on level ℓ, we sometimes specifically call c a level ℓ Bucklin winner.
Fallback voting is a hybrid voting systems designed by Brams and Sanver [BS09] to combine
Bucklin with approval voting. Let us first define approval voting, which was proposed by Brams
and Fishburn [BF78] (see also, e.g., [BF83, BEH+10] for more background). In approval voting,
votes in an election (C,V ) are approval vectors from {0,1}‖C‖ indicating for each candidate c ∈C
whether c is approved (“1”) by this voter or not (“0”). Every candidate with the highest approval
score is an approval winner. For each vote v ∈ V , let Sv denote the approval strategy of v, i.e.,
Sv ⊆C contains the candidates approved by v. In fallback voting, voters first approve or disapprove
measure only, NP-hardness does have its limitations. There are also a number of other approaches that challenge such
NP-hardness results, surveyed in [RS]; for example, there are some experimental results on the control complexity of
Bucklin and fallback voting [RS12].
2Other voting systems whose control complexity has thoroughly been studied include plurality, Condorcet, and
approval voting [BTT92, HHR07], Llull and Copeland voting [FHHR09], a variant of approval voting known as
SP-AV [ENR09], and normalized range voting [Men11].
3In simplified Bucklin voting, all these candidates win. However, we consider Bucklin voting in the unsimplified
version where winners are determined by a slightly more involved procedure. Note that every Bucklin winner, as defined
in the main text, also wins in simplified Bucklin voting, but not necessarily the other way round.
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of all candidates and then they provide a linear ranking of all approved candidates. For example,
some voter might disapprove of c1 and c4, but approve of c2 and c3, preferring c2 to c3; this vote is
denoted by c2 > c3 | {c1,c4}. To determine the winners in fallback voting, we first try to find the
Bucklin winners when they exist. If so, all Bucklin winners are fallback winners. However, due to
disapprovals it might happen that there is no Bucklin winner, and in that case all approval winners
are fallback winners. A bit more formally, given a fallback election (C,V ), let A(c)= {v∈V |c∈ Sv}
denote the set of voters that approve of candidate c∈C, let A j(c) denote the set of voters that approve
of candidate c up to the jth level, and define
score(C,V )(c) = ∑
vi∈A(c)
wi and score j(C,V )(c) = ∑
vi∈A j(c)
wi.
The fallback score of c in (C,V ) is the smallest level k such that scorek(C,V )(c)≥maj(V ). Among the
candidates from C with smallest fallback score, say ℓ, those occurring most often up to level ℓ are
the (level ℓ) fallback winners. Otherwise (i.e., if no candidate in C satisfies scorek(C,V )(c) ≥ maj(V )
for any k ≤ m), all candidates c with maximum score(C,V )(c) are the fallback winners.
It is clear from the definition above that Bucklin elections are special fallback elections where
all voters approve of all candidates. In other scenarios modeling tampering with election results
(e.g., in control scenarios where the chair changes the structure of the election without changing the
voters’ preferences), this implies that NP-hardness results for control problems in Bucklin elections
can be directly transferred to the same control problems in the more general fallback elections. In
manipulation and bribery scenarios, however, such a direct transformation is not possible because
the preferences of certain voters are changed, and we will show our results separately for both voting
systems.
2.2 Basics from Complexity Theory
We assume the reader is familiar with the basic notions from complexity theory such as the com-
plexity classes P and NP, the polynomial-time many-one (≤pm) and Turing (≤pT ) reducibility, and
with hardness and completeness with respect to ≤pm. For more background on complexity theory,
see, e.g., the textbooks [Pap95, Rot05].
3 Manipulation in Bucklin and Fallback Voting
3.1 Definitions and Overview of Results
Conitzer et al. [CSL07] introduced the following decision problem to model manipulation by a
coalition of weighted voters. For a given election system E , define:
E -CONSTRUCTIVE COALITIONAL WEIGHTED MANIPULATION (E -CCWM)
Given: A set C of candidates, a list V of nonmanipulative votes over C each having a
nonnegative integer weight, where WV is the list of these weights, a list WS of
the weights of k manipulators in S (whose votes over C are still unspecified) with
V ∩S = /0, and a designated candidate c ∈C.
Question: Can the votes in S be set such that c is the unique E winner of (C,V ∪S)?
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Table 1: Overview of results for manipulation in Bucklin and fallback voting
Bucklin voting fallback voting
complexity reference complexity reference
E -CCUM P Thm. 3.4 P Prop. 3.2
E -DCUM P Cor. 3.5 P Prop. 3.2
E -CCWM NP-complete Thm. 3.7 P Prop. 3.6
E -DCWM P Thm. 3.9 P Prop. 3.6
The unweighted case E -CCUM is the special case of E -CCWM where all voters and manip-
ulators have unit weight. By changing the question to “. . . such that c is not a unique winner in
(C,V ∪S)?,” we obtain the destructive variants, E -DCWM and E -DCUM. If there is only one ma-
nipulator, we denote the corresponding problems by E -CUM, E -CWM, E -DUM, and E -DWM;
these problems were first studied by Bartholdi et al. [BTT89, BO91].
The following proposition follows immediately from the definitions.
Proposition 3.1 1. E -CUM≤pm E -CCUM≤pm E -CCWM.
2. E -DUM ≤pm E -DCUM≤pm E -DCWM.
3. E -DUM ≤pT E -CUM, E -DWM ≤
p
T E -CWM.
4. E -DCUM≤pT E -CCUM.
5. E -DCWM≤pT E -CCWM.
Table 1 gives an overview of our results for manipulation in Bucklin and fallback voting.
3.2 Results for Unweighted Manipulation
In fallback elections, manipulators that try to make a certain candidate the winner by changing their
votes can follow a simple strategy: They can limit their approval strategy to only this candidate
and thus preclude all other candidates from gaining points from their votes. It is easy to see that if
this attempt is not successful, no other way of constructing the manipulators’ votes can make their
designated candidate win. This means that fallback-CCUM is in P, which implies P-membership
for fallback-CUM, fallback-DCUM, and fallback-DUM as well (with Proposition 3.1). We state
this observation in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 Fallback-CCUM, fallback-CUM, fallback-DCUM, and fallback-DUM are in P.
In Bucklin elections, however, the argumentation is more involved, since the manipulators do
not have the possibility to preclude any candidate from gaining points from their votes. So the
manipulators’ votes have to be carefully constructed to ensure that no other candidate than the
designated candidate gains too much points on the relevant levels.
Nevertheless, we can show that Bucklin-CCUM is in P by adapting an algorithm for simplified-
Bucklin-CCUM that is due to Xia et al. [XZP+09], see Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Bucklin-CCUM
input : C set of candidates
V list of voters
k number of manipulators
p designated candidate
output: “YES” if (C,V,k, p) ∈ Bucklin-CCUM
“NO” if (C,V,k, p) /∈ Bucklin-CCUM
1 if k > ‖V‖ then
2 return “YES”;
3 let rem, rem2, num, num2 be arrays of length m;
4 maj = ⌊ ‖V‖+k2 ⌋+ 1;
5 rmin = min{i | scorei(C,V )(p)+ k ≥ maj};
6 S = list of manipulators;
7 foreach c ∈C−{p} do
8 if min{i | scorei(C,V )(c)≥ maj}< rmin OR scorermin(C,V )(c)≥ score
rmin
(C,V )(p)+ k then
9 return “NO”;
10 rem[c] = scorermin
(C,V )(p)+ k− score
rmin
(C,V )(c)− 1;
11 rem2[c] = maj− scorermin−1(C,V ) (c)− 1;
12 num[c] = min{rem2[c],rem[c],k};
13 num2[c] = min{rem[c],k};
14 if ∑c∈C−{p}min{rem2[c],rem[c],k}< (rmin− 2)k OR ∑c∈C−{p}min{rem[c],k}< (rmin− 1)k then
15 return “NO”;
16 let tmp1, . . . , tmpk represent the manipulators’ votes (empty at the beginning);
17 put p on the first position in all the votes of the manipulators;
18 i = 1;
19 j = 2;
20 foreach c ∈C−{p} do
21 while num[c]> 0 AND j ≤ rmin− 1 do
22 tmpi = tmpi + c;
23 num[c]−−;
24 num2[c]−−;
25 i++;
26 if i == k+ 1 then
27 i = 1;
28 j++;
29
30 foreach c ∈C−{p} do
31 while num2[c]> 0 AND j == rmin do
32 tmpi = tmpi + c;
33 fill the remaining positions of tmpi arbitrarily;
34 S = S+ tmpi;
35 num2[c]−−;
36 i++;
37 if i == k+ 1 then
38 j++;
39
40 return “YES”;
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Before we prove that the presented algorithm is correct and in P, we show the following useful
lemma.
Lemma 3.3 Considering the notation C, V , k, p, rem, rem2, num, num2, rmin, S, and maj as in
Algorithm 1, it holds that:
1. If k > ‖V‖ then (C,V,k, p) ∈ Bucklin-CCUM.
2. If there is a candidate c ∈C−{p} with
(a) min{i | scorei(C,V )(c)≥ maj}< rmin or
(b) scorermin(C,V )(c)≥ scorermin(C,V )(p)+ k,
then (C,V,k, p) /∈ Bucklin-CCUM.
3. (C,V,k, p) /∈ Bucklin-CCUM if and only if
(a) ∑c∈C−{p} min{rem[c],rem2[c],k} < (rmin−2)k or
(b) ∑c∈C−{p} min{rem[c],k} < (rmin−1)k.
Proof. Note that rmin denotes the smallest level on which candidate p reaches the majority thresh-
old maj in the manipulated election assuming that all manipulators position p on the first place. So
rmin is the smallest level on which p can win. This implies that scorermin(C,V )(p)+ k is the number of
points p has to win the election with. Now we can show the three claims.
1. If the number of manipulators is bigger than the number of truthful voters, a successful ma-
nipulation is always possible. The manipulators simply position p on the first place in their
vote and p reaches the majority threshold already on the first level. So (C,V,k, p) ∈ Bucklin-
CCUM trivially holds.
2. Let c ∈C−{p} be an arbitrary candidate.
(a) It holds that min{i | scorei(C,V )(c)≥ maj}< rmin: That means that we have a candidate c
that reaches maj votes on an earlier level than p and c does so even without the manip-
ulators’ votes. Thus (C,V,k, p) /∈ Bucklin-CCUM.
(b) It holds that scorermin(C,V )(c) ≥ scorermin(C,V )(p)+ k: This means that c gets at least as many
points from the truthful voters on the exact level p would have to win the manipulated
election as p gains in the election where the manipulators’ votes have already been
added. That means that p cannot be made the unique winner of the manipulated election
and thus (C,V,k, p) /∈ Bucklin-CCUM holds.
3. The array rem indicates for every candidate c how many further points c can gain without
exceeding scorermin(C,V )(p) on level rmin. The array rem2, on the other hand, indicates for ev-
ery candidate c how many further points c may gain without exceeding maj on the levels 1
to (rmin − 1). For all candidates, rem and rem2 contain positive numbers. Since every can-
didate can gain k points from the manipulators’ votes, num[c] = min{rem[c],rem2[c],k} is
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the number of manipulators that may have candidate c in the first (rmin−1) positions of their
votes without preventing p from winning. Analogously, num2[c] =min{rem[c],k} is the num-
ber of manipulators that can place c among their top rmin positions without preventing p from
winning. We have that num2[c]≥ num[c] for all c ∈C−{p}. We now show the equivalence.
From right to left:
(a) Suppose that ∑c∈C−{p} min{rem[c],rem2[c],k} < (rmin−2)k. In this case, it is not pos-
sible to fill the remaining (rmin−2)k positions (positions 2 to (rmin−1)) in the manipu-
lators’ votes without having for at least one candidate d ∈C−{p} that either
rem2[d]− scorermin−1(C,S) (d)< 0 or
rem[d]− scorermin(C,S)(d)< 0
holds. That is equivalent to either
maj− scorermin−1(C,V ) (d)−1− scorermin−1(C,S) (d)< 0 or
score
rmin
(C,V )(p)+ k− score
rmin
(C,V )(d)−1− score
rmin
(C,S)(d)< 0,
which in turn is equivalent to either
score
rmin−1
(C,V∪S)(d) = score
rmin−1
(C,V ) (d)+ score
rmin−1
(C,S) (d)> maj−1 or
score
rmin
(C,V∪S)(d) = score
rmin
(C,V )(d)+ score
rmin
(C,S)(d)> score
rmin
(C,V )(p)+ k−1.
So we have that either d is a Bucklin winner in the manipulated election on a smaller
level than rmin, or it holds that on level rmin candidate d might have at least as many
points as p. Thus (C,V,k, p) /∈ Bucklin-CCUM.
(b) Suppose that ∑c∈C−{p} min{rem[c],k} < (rmin − 1)k. In this case, it is not possible to
fill the remaining (rmin − 1)k positions (positions 2 to rmin) in the manipulators’ votes
without having for at least one candidate d ∈C−{p}:
rem[d]− scorermin(C,S)(d)< 0
⇔ scorermin
(C,V )(p)+ k− score
rmin
(C,V )(d)−1− score
rmin
(C,S)(d)< 0
⇔ scorermin(C,V∪S)(d) = score
rmin
(C,V )(d)+ score
rmin
(C,S)(d)> score
rmin
(C,V )(p)+ k−1.
So we have that d can have at least as many points as p on level rmin. So (C,V,k, p) /∈
Bucklin-CCUM.
From left to right: We show the contrapositive. Assume that both
(a) ∑c∈C−{p} min{rem[c],rem2[c],k} ≥ (rmin−2)k and
(b) ∑c∈C−{p} min{rem[c],k} ≥ (rmin−1)k
hold. Then we can fill positions 2 to rmin of the manipulators’ votes in a way that for all
candidates e ∈C−{p} the following holds:
rem2[e]− score
rmin−1
(C,S) (e)≥ 0 and
rem[e]− scorermin(C,S)(e)≥ 0,
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which is equivalent to
score
rmin−1
(C,V∪S)(e) = score
rmin−1
(C,V ) (e)+ score
rmin−1
(C,S) (e)≤ maj−1 and
score
rmin
(C,V∪S)(e) = score
rmin
(C,V )(e)+ score
rmin
(C,S)(e)≤ score
rmin
(C,V )(p)+ k−1.
So we have that (C,V,k, p) ∈ Bucklin-CCUM.
This completes the proof. ❑
Now we are ready to show that Algorithm 1 is in P and correctly solves Bucklin-CCUM.
Theorem 3.4 Algorithm 1 has a runtime of O(m2+nm) and decides Bucklin-CCUM, and thus this
problem is in P.
Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 3.3 that Algorithm 1 is correct. It is also clear that it
always terminates. To compute the needed scores scorei(C,V )(c) for all candidates c and every level i,
O(m2+nm) steps are needed. The for-loop in line 7 needs O(m) steps, while the other two for-loops
in lines 20 and 30 need O(km) steps. Since the loops are only run through when k ≤ n, we have a
runtime of O(nm) for the loops, which implies that the algorithm has a runtime of O(m2 + nm) in
total. ❑
With Theorem 3.4 and Proposition 3.1 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5 Bucklin-CUM, Bucklin-DUM, Bucklin-CCUM, and Bucklin-DCUM are in P.
3.3 Results for Weighted Manipulation
In this section we analyze the complexity of weighted manipulation in Bucklin and fallback voting.
With the same argumentation as that given at the beginning of Section 3.2, it is easy to see
that in fallback elections the weighted manipulation problems can be decided efficiently, namely in
deterministic polynomial time: In the constructive, coalitional, weighted case, all the manipulators
need to do is to approve of the designated candidate—if this attempt does not lead to the desired
result, no other way of changing the manipulators’ votes will. Again, with Proposition 3.1, the result
for this case directly transfers to the constructive, weighted case with only one manipulator, and
from these two constructive cases to the corresponding destructive cases. We state this observation
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6 Fallback-CCWM, fallback-CWM, fallback-DCWM, and fallback-DWM are
in P.
In weighted Bucklin elections, on the other hand, a coalition of manipulators trying to make a
certain candidate win is faced with a harder challenge, as the following result shows.
Theorem 3.7 Bucklin-CCWM is NP-complete.
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Proof. It is easy to see that Bucklin-CCWM is in NP. We show NP-hardness of this problem by
a reduction from the problem PARTITION: Given a set A = {1, . . . ,k} and a sequence (a1, . . . ,ak)
of nonnegative integers with ∑ki=1 ai = 2K for a positive integer K, is there a set A′ ⊆ A such that
∑i∈A′ ai = ∑i6∈A′ ai = K? PARTITION is well-known to be NP-complete (see, e.g., [GJ79]).
Let an instance of PARTITION be given by A = {1,2, . . . ,k} and (a1, . . . ,ak) with ∑ki=1 ai = 2K.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that ai ≥ 2 for each i ∈ A. We construct the following
instance of Bucklin-CCWM. The candidate set is C = {b,c,d, p} and p is the designated candidate.
In V we have three voters of the following form with a total weight of 6K−2:
1. c > p > d > b with weight 2K,
2. c > d > p > b with weight K−1,
3. b > d > p > c with weight 3K−1,
so the majority threshold in (C,V ) is reached with ⌊(6K−2)/2⌋+ 1 = 3K. For the first two levels,
the scores of the candidates are given in Table 2, and the unique level 2 Bucklin winner in (C,V )
is d. Furthermore, there are k manipulators in S with weights a1,a2, . . . ,ak, which are given in our
Bucklin-CCWM instance.
Table 2: Level i scores in (C,V ) for i ∈ {1,2} and the candidates in C
b c d p
score1 3K−1 3K−1 0 0
score2 3K−1 3K−1 4K−2 2K
We claim that (A,(a1,a2, . . . ,ak))∈ PARTITION if and only if p can be made the unique Bucklin
winner in (C,V ∪S).
From left to right: Assume that there is a subset A′⊆A with ∑i∈A′ ai =K. The majority threshold
in (C,V ∪S) is ⌊(6K−2+2K)/2⌋+1 = 4K. Let the votes of the manipulators be of the following form
• p > c > b > d for all manipulators with weight ai for i ∈ A′, and
• p > b > c > d for the remaining manipulators.
For the first two levels, the scores of the candidates in (C,V ∪S) are given in Table 3. It follows
that p is the unique level 2 Bucklin winner in (C,V ∪S).
From right to left: Assume that there are votes for the manipulators in S that make p the unique
winner of (C,V ∪ S). Without loss of generality, assume that p is on the first position in all votes
Table 3: Level i scores in (C,V ∪S) for i ∈ {1,2} and the candidates in C
b c d p
score1 3K−1 3K−1 0 2K
score2 4K−1 4K−1 4K−2 4K
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in S. Note that p cannot win the manipulated election on the first level, so p has to be the unique
level 2 winner with score2(C,V∪S)(p) = 4K. This implies that score
2
(C,V∪S)(e) < 4K has to hold for
all e ∈ {b,c,d}. Since ai ≥ 2, candidate d cannot be on the second position in any manipulator’s
vote. Thus, the manipulators’ votes can be only of the form (p > c > b > d), (p > c > d > b),
(p > b > c > d), or (p > b > d > c). The candidates b and c have already 3K − 1 points on
the second level in (C,V ), so they each cannot gain more than K points on the second level from
the votes in S. Since all votes in S have either b or c on the second position, the weights of the
manipulators have to be of the form that a subset A′ ⊆ A can be found such that those manipulators
with weight ai, i∈ A′, have a total weight of K and put one of b and c (say b) on the second position,
and the remaining manipulators (those with weight ai for i 6∈ A′) put the other candidate, c, on the
second position and have a total weight of K as well. Thus, (A,(a1,a2, . . . ,ak)) is a yes-instance of
PARTITION. ❑
We now turn to the desctructive variant of coalitional weighted manipulation and give a deter-
ministic polynomial-time algorithm for this problem in Bucklin voting.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for Bucklin-DCWM
input : C set of candidates
V list of voters
WV weights of the voters
WS weights of the manipulators
p designated candidate
output: “YES” if (C,V,WV ,WS, p) ∈ Bucklin-DCWM
“NO” if (C,V,WV ,WS, p) /∈ Bucklin-DCWM
1 if ∑w∈WS w > ∑w∈WV w then
2 return “YES”;
3 foreach c ∈C−{p} do
4 put p on the last position in the manipulators’ votes;
5 put c on the first position in the manipulators’ votes;
6 fill the remaining positions in the manipulators’ votes arbitrarily;
7 let S be the list of the manipulators’ votes
8 if (p not a unique winner of (C,V ∪S) with weights WV ∪WS) then
9 return “YES”;
10
11 return “NO”;
Before proving the runtime and correctness of the above algorithm, we state the following useful
lemma, which is easily seen to hold.
Lemma 3.8 Let (C,V ) be a weighted Bucklin election with weights W and c, p ∈ C. Then the
following holds.
1. Assume that c is not a winner in (C,V ) and that the votes in V are changed in a way such that
only the position of c is made worse. Then c is still not a winner.
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2. Assume that c is a winner of the election and that the votes in V are changed in a way such
that only the position of c is improved. Then c remains a winner.
3. Assume that c is a winner of the election and that p is not a winner. If in some votes the
positions of candidates are swapped without changing the positions of c and p, then p is still
not a winner.
We now analyze Algorithm 2 for Bucklin-DCWM.
Theorem 3.9 Algorithm 2 has a runtime in O(m2(n+‖WS‖)) and decides Bucklin-DCWM.
Proof. We begin with analyzing the runtime. Obviously, the algorithm always terminates and the
input size is in O( m
︸︷︷︸
‖C‖
+ nm
︸︷︷︸
‖V‖
+ n
︸︷︷︸
‖WV‖
+‖WS‖+ 1︸︷︷︸
‖p‖
) = O(nm+‖WS‖).
The most costly part of the algorithm is the for-loop. To construct the manipulators’ votes,
O(‖WS‖m) steps are needed. The winner-determination procedure for Bucklin can be implemented
with a runtime of O(nm), so the if-statement in line 8 can be computed in time O(m(n+ ‖WS‖).
Thus, the whole for-loop runs in time O(m2(n+‖WS‖)).
To prove the correctnes of the algorithm, we show that it gives the output “YES” if and only if
(C,V,WV ,WS, p) ∈ Bucklin-DCWM.
From left to right: If the algorithm outputs “YES” in line 2 then we have ∑w∈WS w > ∑w∈WV w,
i.e., the sum of the manipulators’ weights is greater than the sum of the weights of the nonmanip-
ulative voters. In this case, any of the candidates c 6= p can be made the unique level 1 Bucklin
winner in (C,V ∪S) by putting c on the first position in all the manipulators’ votes and filling the re-
maining positions arbitrarily. Hence, (C,V,WV ,WS, p) ∈ Bucklin-DCWM. If the algorithm outputs
“YES” in line 9, the manipulators’ votes have been constructed such that p is not a unique winner
in (C,V ∪S). Thus, we have that (C,V,WV ,WS, p) is a yes-instance of Bucklin-DCWM.
From right to left: Assume that (C,V,WV ,WS, p) ∈ Bucklin-DCWM. If ∑w∈WS w > ∑w∈WV w,
then the algorithm correctly outputs “YES.” Otherwise, the following holds: Since the given in-
stance is a yes-instance of Bucklin-DCWM, the votes of the manipulators in S can be set such that
p is not a winner of the election (C,V ∪S). We know from Lemma 3.8 that successively swapping p
with her neighbor until p is on the last position in all votes in S does not change the fact that p is not
a winner in (C,V ∪S′) (where S′ are the new manipulative votes with p on the last position). Assume
that c ∈C−{p} is a winner in (C,V ∪S). Then swap her position successively with her neighbor in
the votes in S′ until c is on the first position in all manipulative votes. Let S′′ denote the accordingly
changed list of manipulative votes. Again, from Lemma 3.8 we know that c still wins in (C,V ∪S′′).
Let S′′′ be the list of manipulative votes that the algorithm constructs. We can transform S′′ into S′′′
by swapping the corresponding candidates c′,c′′ ∈C−{c, p} accordingly. Since the positions of c
and p remain unchanged, we have with Lemma 3.8 that p is still not a winner in (C,V ∪S′′′). Thus,
the algorithm outputs “YES” in line 9. ❑
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4 Bribery in Bucklin and Fallback Voting
4.1 Definition of Bribery Problems and Overview of Results
We begin with defining the standard bribery scenarios proposed by Faliszewski et al. [FHH09] (see
also [FHHR09]) that will be applied here to fallback and Bucklin elections. Let E be a given election
system.
E -CONSTRUCTIVE UNWEIGHTED BRIBERY (E -CUB)
Given: An E election (C,V ), a designated candidate p, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question: Is it possible to make p the unique E winner by changing the votes of at most k
voters?
This basic bribery scenario can be extended by either considering voters with different weights,
or allowing that each voter has a different price for changing her vote, or both. These three scenarios
are formally defined by the following problems:
E -CONSTRUCTIVE WEIGHTED BRIBERY (E -CWB)
Given: An E election (C,V ) with each voter vi ∈ V having a nonnegative integer
weight wi, a designated candidate p, and a positive integer k.
Question: Is it possible to make p the unique E winner by changing the votes of at most k
voters?
E -CONSTRUCTIVE UNWEIGHTED PRICED BRIBERY (E -CUB-$)
Given: An E election (C,V ) with each voter vi ∈V having a nonnegative integer price pii,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, a designated candidate p, and a positive integer k.
Question: Is there a set B ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} such that ∑
i∈B
pii ≤ k and the voters vi with i ∈ B can
be bribed so that p is the unique E winner in the resulting election?
E -CONSTRUCTIVE WEIGHTED PRICED BRIBERY (E -CWB-$)
Given: An E election (C,V ) with each voter vi ∈ V having nonnegative integer weight
wi and price pii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a designated candidate p, and a positive integer k.
Question: Is there a set B ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} such that ∑
i∈B
pii ≤ k and the voters vi with i ∈ B can
be bribed so that p is the unique E winner in the resulting election?
By changing the question in the above four problems to ask whether p can be prevented from
being a unique winner of the election by bribing some of the voters, we obtain the destructive
variants of these bribery scenarios, and we denote the corresponding problems by E -DUB, E -
DWB, E -DUB-$, and E -DWB-$. The problems related to the general bribery scenarios without
explicitly specifying the constructive or destructive case are denoted by E -UB, E -WB, E -UB-$,
and E -WB-$.
Table 4 gives an overview of our complexity results for bribery in Bucklin and fallback voting.
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Table 4: Overview of results for bribery in Bucklin and fallback voting
Bucklin voting fallback voting
complexity reference complexity reference
E -CUB NP-complete Thm. 4.1 NP-complete Thm. 4.3
E -DUB P Cor. 4.6 P Thm. 4.7
E -CUB-$ NP-complete Cor. 4.2 NP-complete Cor. 4.4
E -DUB-$ P Thm. 4.5 P Thm. 4.7
E -CWB NP-complete Cor. 4.2 NP-complete Cor. 4.4
E -DWB P Thm. 4.5 P Thm. 4.7
E -CWB-$ NP-complete Cor. 4.2 NP-complete Cor. 4.4
E -DWB-$ NP-complete Thm. 4.8 NP-complete Thm. 4.9
4.2 Results for Bribery
We start with the constructive cases of the standard bribery scenarios.
Theorem 4.1 CUB is NP-complete for Bucklin voting.
Proof. Membership of Bucklin-CUB in NP is obvious. We show NP-hardness by a reduction
from EXACT COVER BY THREE-SETS (X3C): Given a set B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m ≥ 1, and a
collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets Si ⊆ B with ‖Si‖ = 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is there a
subcollection S ′ ⊆ S such that each element of B occurs in exactly one set in S ′? X3C is a
well-known NP-complete problem (see, e.g., [GJ79]).
Let (B,S ) be an instance of X3C with B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m} and S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn}. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that n≥ 2m. We construct a Bucklin-CUB instance ((C,V ), p,k),
where (C,V ) is a Bucklin election with the candidates C = B∪{c,d}∪G∪{p}, p is the designated
candidate, and k = m. G is a set of “padding candidates,” which are used to ensure that certain
candidates do not gain points up to a certain level. Padding candidates are positioned in the votes
such that, up to a certain level, they do not gain enough points (e.g., at most one) to be relevant for
the central argumentation of the proof. Thus, their scores are not listed in tables giving the scores
of the relevant candidates.
For every b j ∈ B, define ℓ j to be the number of sets Si ∈ S candidate b j is contained in. V
consists of the following 2n voters (i.e., a strict majority is reached with n+1 votes):
• The first voter group consists of n voters. For each i, 1 ≤ i≤ n, we have one voter of the form
c > d > Si > G1 > {C− ({c,d}∪Si∪G1)},
where G1 ⊆ G is a set of 3m−3 padding candidates. When a set X of candidates is giving in
such a ranking, the order of the candidates from X can be fixed arbitrarily in this ranking.
• The second voter group consists of n voters as well. We will present the preferences level by
level from the first to the (3m+2)nd position in Table 5.
Note that the padding candidates in G are positioned in the votes such that every gk ∈G gains at
most one point up to level 3m+2. Table 6(a) shows the scores of the relevant candidates in (C,V )
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Table 5: Construction of Bucklin election (C,V ) in the proof of Theorem 4.1
position # voters candidate
1
m c
m d
n−2m gk
2 n+1− ℓ1 b1
ℓ1−1 from G2
3 n+1− ℓ2 b2
ℓ2−1 from G2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
3m+1 n+1− ℓ3n b3m
ℓ3n−1 from G2
3m+2 n−m+1 p
m−1 from G2
Table 6: Level i scores for i ∈ {1,2,3m,3m+ 1,3m+ 2} and the candidates in C−G
(a) Original election (C,V )
bi ∈ B c d p
score1 0 n+m m 0
score2 ≤ n+1 n+m m+n 0
score3m ≤ n+1 n+m m+n 0
score3m+1 ≤ n+1 n+m m+n 0
score3m+2 n+1 n+m m+n n−m+1
(b) Modified election (C,V ′)
bi ∈ B c d p
score1 0 n m m
score2 ≤ n n n m
score3m ≤ n n n m
score3m+1 ≤ n n n m
score3m+2 ≤ n n n n+1
(namely, c, d, p, and each b j ∈ B) for the relevant levels (namely, 1, 2, 3m, 3m+1, and 3m+2) and,
in particular, that c is the unique level 1 Bucklin winner in (C,V ).
We claim that S has an exact cover S ′ for B if and only if p can be made the unique Bucklin
winner by changing at most m votes in V .
From left to right: Let S ′ be an exact cover for B and let I ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} be the set of indices of
the m elements in S ′. To make p the unique Bucklin winner, we only have to change votes in the
first voter group: For each i ∈ I, change the corresponding vote
c > d > Si > G1 > {C− ({c,d}∪Si∪G1)}
to
p > G1 > g′1 > g′2 > g′3 > g′4 > {C− ({g′1,g′2,g′3,g′4, p}∪G1)},
where each g′j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, is from G but not in G1.
14
With these new votes, c and d both lose m points on the first two levels from the first voter group
and p gains m points on the first level. Every candidate bi ∈ B loses exactly one point on one of the
levels 3, 4, or 5. The scores in the resulting election (C,V ′) are shown in Table 6(b). As one can
see, p is the first candidate to reach a strict majority of n+1 votes (namely, on level 3m+2) and is
thus the unique level 3m+2 Bucklin winner in the new election.
From right to left: Assume that p is the unique Bucklin winner of the election (C,V ′), where
V ′ is the new voter list containing the m changed votes. Since only m votes can be changed and
p did not score any points prior to level 3m+ 2 in the original election, p has to be a level 3m+ 2
Bucklin winner in (C,V ′). Candidates c and d originally reach the majority threshold already on,
respectively, the first and the second level, so all votes that can be changed must place c and d on
the first two positions. The only votes doing so are those in the first voter group. Finally, to prevent
the candidates in B from reaching a strict majority on level 3m+ 2, each of the 3m candidates has
to lose at least one point by changing at most m votes. This, again, can only be done by changing
votes from the first voter group and there has to be an exact cover S ′ for B whose corresponding
voters from the first voter group have to be changed. ❑
The following corollary follows immediately from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.2 In Bucklin elections, CWB, CUB-$, and CWB-$ are NP-complete.
Based on the corresponding proof for approval voting that is due to Faliszewski et al. [FHH09],
we can show NP-completeness for unweighted bribery in fallback elections as well.
Theorem 4.3 CUB is NP-complete for fallback voting.
Proof. Fallback-CUB obviously is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we give a reduction from X3C.
Let (B,S ) be an instance of X3C with B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m} and S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn}. We define
the fallback election (C,V ) with the candidate set C = B∪ E ∪ {p}, where p is the designated
candidate and E is a set of n+m padding candidates. For every j ∈ {1, . . . ,3m}, we define ℓ j as
the number of subsets Si ∈ S candidate b j ∈ B is contained in. Using this notation, we define the
subsets Bi = {b j ∈ B | i ≤ n− ℓ j} for i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. V consists of the 4n voters whose preferences
are given in Table 7.
Table 7: Construction of fallback election (C,V ) in the proof of Theorem 4.3
# For each . . . number of votes ranking of candidates
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 Si | (B−Si)∪E ∪{p}
2 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 Bi | (B−Bi)∪E ∪{p}
3 n−m p | B∪E
4 ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,n+m} 1 eℓ | B∪ (E−{eℓ}∪{p}
In this election, we have that score(p) = n−m, score(b j) = n for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,3m}, and
score(eℓ) = 1 for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,n+m}. Since no candidate reaches a strict majority (at least 2n+1
points), all candidates b j ∈ B are fallback winners of this election.
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We claim that S has an exact cover S ′ for B if and only if p can be made the unique fallback
winner by bribing at most m voters.
From left to right: Suppose that S has an exact cover S ′ for B. We change the vote of those
voters in the first voter group where Si ∈S ′ from Si | (B−Si)∪E∪{p} to p | B∪E . In the resulting
election (C,V ′) only the scores of the candidates in B and the score of p change: p gains m points,
whereas each b j ∈ B loses exactly one point. Thus, with an overall score of n, candidate p is the
unique fallback winner of the resulting election.
From right to left: Suppose that p can be made the unique fallback winner by changing at most
m votes in V . That means that p can gain at most m points, so the maximum overall score that p can
reach is n. Since each b j ∈ B has an overall score of n, every candidate in B has to lose at least one
point by changing at most m votes (otherwise, there would be at least one candidate in B that ties
with p). This is possible only if in m votes of the first voter group the candidates in Si are removed
from the approval strategy such that these m sets Si form an exact cover for B. ❑
This result immediately implies NP-hardness for the remaining constructive bribery scenarios
in fallback elections as well.
Corollary 4.4 In fallback elections, CWB, CUB-$, and CWB-$ are NP-complete.
We now turn to the destructive cases. The following result generalizes a result due to Xia [Xia12]
who showed that DUB is in P for simplified Bucklin voting.
Theorem 4.5 In Bucklin elections, DWB and DUB-$ are in P.
Proof. Both problems, Bucklin-DWB and Bucklin-DUB-$, can be solved by deterministic
polynomial-time algorithms that use Algorithm 2, which was designed in Section 3 to solve the de-
structive coalitional weighted manipulation problem for Bucklin elections, Bucklin-DCWM. The
main difference between a bribery and a manipulation instance is that in the latter only the prefer-
ences of the manipulators have to be found, whereas in the former both the votes that will be bribed
and the new preferences for these voters have to be found. If we have the set of votes we want to
change, we can use the algorithm for the manipulation problem to construct the preferences. Thus,
for the runtime of the algorithm the determination of these voter sets is crucial, and we show that in
Bucklin elections the number of voter sets whose modification might actually lead to a successful
bribery is bounded by a polynomial in both the number of voters and the number of candidates.
Consider Algorithm 3 and a given input (C,V,WV , p,k) to it. In particular, p is the designated
candidate that we want to prevent from winning and assume that we have a yes-instance, i.e., our
bribery action is successful. We denote by (C,V ′′) the election resulting from (C,V ) where the k
votes that can be changed have already been changed. Then there is a candidate c ∈ C−{p} that
reaches a strict majority on level i, and it holds that scorei(C,V ′′)(c) ≥ scorei(C,V ′′)(p), which means
that p is not a unique winner in (C,V ′′). To reach that, for each i < m, there are only five types of
preferences that might have been changed in V , and they can be grouped into the following subsets
Ti, j ⊆V , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5:
Ti,1: p is among the top i− 1 position and c is among the top i positions (when changing: p loses
points, c does neither lose nor win points up to level i).
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Ti,2: p is among the top i− 1 position and c is not among the top i positions (when changing: p
loses points, c wins points up to level i).
Ti,3: p is on position i and c is among the top i positions (when changing: p loses points, c does
neither lose nor win points up to level i).
Ti,4: p is on position i and c is not among the top i positions (when changing: p loses points, c wins
points up to level i).
Ti,5: both p and c are not among the top i positions (when changing: p does neither lose nor win
points, c wins points up to level i).
For a sublist of voters V ′ ⊆V , denote their total weight by W ′V . Algorithm 3 for Bucklin-DWB
works as follows.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm for Bucklin-DWB
input : C set of candidates
V list of voters
WV list of weights of voters
k number of votes that may be changed
p designated candidate
output: “YES” if (C,V,WV ,k, p) ∈ Bucklin-DWB
“NO” if (C,V,WV ,k, p) /∈ Bucklin-DWB
1 let A = {(a1,a2, . . . ,a5) |ai ∈ {0,1, . . . ,k}}, V ′ = /0;
2 foreach c ∈C−{p} do
3 foreach i < m do
4 foreach (a1,a2, . . . ,a5) ∈ A do
5 if ∑5ℓ=1 aℓ ≤ k then
6 foreach j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,5} do
7 add the a j heaviest votes in Ti, j to V ′;
8 run Algorithm 2 on input (C,V −V ′,WV−V ′ ,WV ′ , p);
9 if Bucklin-DCWM(C,V −V ′,WV−V ′ ,WV ′ , p)= “YES” then
10 return “YES”;
11
12
13 return “NO”;
It is easy to see that Algorithm 3 runs in deterministic polynomial time: the two outer for-loops
iterate up to m times, whereas the inner loop tests up to k5 variations of the vector (a1,a2, . . . ,a5).
Since k ≤ n, we have that the number of executions of Algorithm 2 is in O(m2n5).
For the proof of correctnes, we show that given a bribery instance (C,V,WV ,k, p), the output of
Algorithm 3 is “YES” if and only if (C,V,WV ,k, p) ∈ Bucklin-DWB.
From left to right: If the algorithm returns “YES” in line 10, then Algorithm 2 could find a
successful destructive manipulation regarding p for k manipulators with total weight WV ′ . So p is
not a unique Bucklin winner in the election (C,V ′′), where V ′′ is the list of voters with k changed
votes. That means that (C,V,WV ,k, p) ∈ Bucklin-DWB.
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From right to left: Assume that (C,V,WV ,k, p) ∈ Bucklin-DWB. Thus, there exists a set of
k voters V ′ with total weight WV ′ such that changing these votes prevents p from being a unique
Bucklin winner in (C,V ′′), where V ′′ is the new voter list containing the k changed votes. We want to
show that such a V ′′ can always be transformed to the list of votes V ′ that is changed in Algorithm 3.
From our assumptions it follows that we have a candidate c ∈C−{p} and a level i < m such that c
is a level i Bucklin winner that prevents p from being a unique winner.
Assume that in V ′′ are voters whose preferences were not in one of the Ti before the changes
were made, i.e., votes were changed that not necessarily needed to be changed to prevent p from
being the only winner. Undo these changes and change the same number of votes in the lists Ti that
were not changed before. We then have that all changed votes are in one of the Ti.
Since Bucklin is monotonic, we can always exchange votes with higher weight with votes of
lower weight (in one Ti) without risking that p would win due to this exchange. So we know that
we can transform any given list of bribed votes to a list that the algorithm would construct and this
would still prevent p from winning alone. So if there is a list of k voters that can be successfully
bribed to prevent p from being the unique winner, the algorithm will find it.
For the Bucklin-DUB-$ problem the same algorithm can be used. The only difference is that
all weights have to be set to one, the cheapest instead of the heaviest votes (i.e., those votes with the
least price instead of the greatest weight) are added to V ′ in line 7, and it has to be tested whether
the sum of the chosen votes does not exceed the budget. ❑
From Theorem 4.5 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.6 In Bucklin elections, DUB is in P.
This algorithm can be easily adapted for fallback elections. Due to the fact that in fallback
elections the voters do not have to rank all candidates, it is possible that a candidate wins on level m.
So by making the following changes in Algorithm 2:
• change “i < m” in line 3 to “i ≤ m,”
• use the fallback analogue of Algorithm 2 in line 8,4 and
• change “Bucklin-DCWM” in line 9 to “Fallback-DCWM,”
we can decide DWB for fallback elections as well.
Theorem 4.7 In fallback elections, DWB, DUB, and DUB-$ are in P.
It remains to show the complexity of the destructive variant of priced bribery in weighted Buck-
lin and fallback elections. We begin with showing NP-hardness of this problem for Bucklin voting.
Theorem 4.8 Bucklin-DWB-$ is NP-complete.
4In Section 3.3, we refrained from explicitly stating the algorithm for fallback-DCWM that is based on the following
simple idea: For every candidate c 6= p, try to make c win by setting the manipulators’ votes to c | C−{c}. If such a
candidate can be found, p has been successfully prevented from being the unique winner of the election; otherwise, it is
impossible to do so.
18
Proof. That Bucklin-DWB-$ is in NP is again easy to see. We show NP-hardness by a reduction
from PARTITION. Let (A,(a1, . . . ,ak)) with A = {1, . . . ,k} and ∑ki=1 ai = 2K be an instance of
PARTITION. We construct the following Bucklin election (C,V ) with C = {c, p} and k votes in V :
For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, we have one voter with weight wi = ai, price pii = ai, and preference p > c.
The total weight in (C,V ) is 2K. Let K be the budget that may not be exceeded and let p be the
designated candidate. Obviously, p is the unique level 1 Bucklin winner in (C,V ).
We claim that (A,(a1, . . . ,ak)) ∈ PARTITION if and only if p can be prevented from being the
unique Bucklin winner by changing votes in V without exceeding the budget K.
From left to right: Let (A,(a1, . . . ,ak))∈ PARTITION with A′⊆A such that ∑i∈A′ ai =K. Change
the votes of those voters with wi = ai for i ∈ A′ from p > c to c > p. With these changes we have
that on the first level, both p and c have exactly K points, so no strict majority. On the second level,
both candidates have 2K points and thus are both level 2-Bucklin winners. Hence, p is not a unique
Bucklin winner in the bribed election.
From right to left: Assume that p is not a unique Bucklin winner in the bribed election. Since
there are only two levels, either c is the unique level 1 winner, or p and c both win on the second
level. The price and weight of every voter is the same, so voters with a total weight of K can
be changed. Candidate c has 0 points in the original election, so it is not possible to make c a
unique level 1 winner without exceeding the budget K. To prevent p from remaining the unique
winner on the first level, the budget has to be fully exhausted and votes with a total weight of K
must be changed from p > c to c > p. Thus, there is a subset A′ ⊆ A such that ∑i∈A′ ai = K, so
(A,(a1, . . . ,ak)) ∈ PARTITION. ❑
Theorem 4.9 states the corresponding result for fallback voting using a similar proof idea.
Theorem 4.9 Fallback-DWB-$ is NP-complete.
Proof. Obviously, fallback-DWB-$ is in NP. NP-hardness is shown by a reduction from PAR-
TITION. To this end, let (A,(a1, . . . ,ak)) with A = {1, . . . ,k} and ∑ki=1 ai = 2K be an instance of
PARTITION. We construct a fallback election (C,V ) with the candidate set C = {c, p} and the des-
ignated candidate p. Let V consist of k voters v1, . . . ,vk, each having preference p | {c}, weight
wi = ai, and price pii = ai. The total weight in (C,V ) is 2K and p is the unique fallback winner in
this election. Let the briber’s budget be K.
We claim that (A,(a1, . . . ,ak)) ∈ PARTITION if and only if p can be prevented from being the
unique fallback winner by changing votes in V without exceeding the budget K.
From left to right: Assume that there is a set A′ ⊆ A such that ∑i∈A′ ai = K. We change the votes
of each voter vi with i ∈ A′ from p | {c} to c | {p}. Then both candidates, p and c, have an overall
score of K and are both fallback winners of the resulting election.
From right to left: Assume that p can be prevented from being the unique fallback winner by
changing votes in V without exceeding the budget K. This is possible only if candidate c at least
ties with p after the changes in the votes have been made. Since each voter’s weight and price are
the same, c can gain at most K points without exceeding the budget K. To prevent p from being the
unique fallback winner, c has to gain at least K points, so together with the budget restriction c has
to gain exactly K points. Thus, there has to be a set A′ ⊆ A such that ∑i∈A′ ai = K. ❑
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5 Campaign Management
In the discussion so far, we have focused on bribery and manipulation as means of attacking Bucklin
and fallback elections. However, it is also quite natural to consider bribery scenarios through the
lenses of running a political campaign. After all, in a successful campaign, the candidates spend
their effort (measured in terms of time, in terms of financial cost of organizing promotional activi-
ties, and even in terms of the difficulty of convincing particular voters) to change the minds of the
voters. Thus, formally, a campaign preceding an election can be seen as exchanging some resources
for voters’ support. Formally, this idea is very close to bribery (indeed, this view of campaign
management was first presented in a paper whose focus was on a bribery problem [EFS09]).
5.1 Definitions and Overview of Results
We start by discussing one of the most general campaign management problems, namely the SWAP
BRIBERY problem introduced by Elkind et al. [EFS09]. This problem models a situation where a
campaign manager, who is interested in the victory of a given candidate p, can organize meetings
with specific voters (the unweighted variant of the problem) or with groups of like-minded voters
(the weighted variant) and convince them to change their preference orders. However, the difficulty
(or, as we will say from now on, the cost) of changing the voters’ preference orders depends both
on the voter and on the extent of the change (for example, it might be expensive to swap a voter’s
most preferred candidate with this voter’s least preferred one, but it might be very cheap to swap
the voter’s two least preferred candidates). Formally, Elkind et al. [EFS09] define so-called swap-
bribery price functions that for each voter and for each pair of candidates give the cost of swapping
these two candidates in the voter’s preference order (provided the candidates are adjacent in this
order).
Definition 5.1 (Elkind et al. [EFS09]) A swap-bribery price function for voter vi is a function pii :
C×C → N that specifies for any ordered pair (ci,c j) of candidates the price for changing vi’s
preference order from · · · > ci > c j > · · · to · · · > c j > ci > · · · . Only candidates that are adjacent
in a vote can be swapped.
In the E -CONSTRUCTIVE SWAP BRIBERY problem we ask if there exists a sequence of swaps of
adjacent candidates that lead to a given candidate being a winner (note that the swaps are performed
in sequence; even if some candidates are not adjacent at first, they may become adjacent in the
course of performing the swaps and, then, can be swapped themselves).5
E -CONSTRUCTIVE UNWEIGHTED SWAP BRIBERY (E -CUSB)
Given: An E -election (C,V ), where V = (v1, . . . ,vn), a designated candidate p, a list
(pi1, . . . ,pin) of swap bribery price functions, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question: Can p be made the unique E winner of an election resulting from the input elec-
tion by conducting a sequence of swaps of adjacent candidates in the voters’
ballots such that the total cost of the swaps does not exceed the budget k?
5We mention that Elkind et al. [EFS09] defined the problem for the nonunique-winner model. Here we adopt the
unique-winner model to stay in sync with the rest of the paper. However, it will be easy to see that all the results from
this section hold in the nonunique-winner model as well.
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We define the weighted variant of the problem, E -CWSB, in the standard way (as far as we can
tell, the weighted variant of the problem has not been studied before). However, it will soon become
clear why the weighted variant is not particularly interesting and so we omit the easy modification
of the definition. We also define the destructive variants of the swap bribery problems (E -DUSB-$
and E -DWSB-$) in the usual way, by changing the question to ask whether p can be prevented from
being a unique winner.
Swap bribery is a very difficult problem—it is NP-complete for almost all natural voting rules
(and, in particular, in the next section we will see a very strong hardness result for the Bucklin
and fallback rules). Thus Elkind et al. [EFS09] defined its much-simplified variant, shift-bribery,
where every swap has to involve the designated candidate p (that is, the designated candidate can be
“shifted” forward in selected votes). The complexity of this problem was studied for a number of
voting rules [EFS09, EF10a, DS12], including Bucklin and fallback voting [SFE11]. Interestingly,
even though we will see strong hardness results for swap bribery under Bucklin and fallback, shift
bribery for these rules is in P.
The definitions of swap bribery and shift bribery are very natural for voting rules where each
voter ranks all the candidates; for the case of fallback, where the ballots consist of the approved
part (where the candidates are ranked) and of the disapproved part (where the candidates are not
ranked), we need to extend the definitions. In our approach, we define swap bribery under fallback
to allow the swaps within the approved parts of the votes only. Naturally, one could also define costs
for including given disapproved candidates in the approved part and, indeed, Elkind et al. [EFS09]
did so for SP-AV (SP-AV is a variant of the approval system).6 However, following Schlotter
et al. [SFE11], we believe that it is more informative to study the complexity of modifying the
rankings within the approved parts and the complexity of modifying the sets of approved candidates
separately.
Regarding the latter type of problems, Schlotter et al. [SFE11] defined the support bribery prob-
lem for the fallback rule (and other hybrid rules), where each voter has a complete preference order
over the whole set of candidates, but also has an approval threshold, a number of top candidates
that this voter approves of. For each voter we have a price function that gives the cost of increas-
ing/decreasing the approval threshold; the goal is to change the voters’ approval thresholds in such
a way as to ensure the victory of a given candidate. Schlotter et al. [SFE11] show that this problem
is NP-complete for fallback.7 However, in our model the disapproved candidates are not ranked
and, thus, it is much more natural to study the extension bribery problem introduced by Baumeister
et al. [BFLR12]. The idea of extension bribery is to capture very non-invasive campaign actions,
where we try to convince some voters to include the designated candidate at the end of the ranking
of approved candidates.
Definition 5.2 (Baumeister et al. [BFLR12]) The extension bribery price function δi : N→ N of
a voter vi defines the price for extending the approved part of vi’s vote with a given number of
6Like fallback voting, SP-AV is a hybrid variant of approval voting. It has been introduced by Brams and San-
ver [BS06] and slightly modified by Erde´lyi et al. [ENR09] to cope with certain control actions (see also the chapter by
Baumeister et al. [BEH+10] for a through discussion of this voting system).
7They also show that the problem is hard in the sense of parametrized complexity for two natural parameters describing
the extent of change to the approval thresholds. Interestingly, they show the problem to be fixed-parameter tractable if
the thresholds can either only increase or only decrease.
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Table 8: Overview of results for swap bribery and extension bribery in Bucklin and fallback voting
Bucklin voting fallback voting
complexity reference complexity reference
E -CUSB NP-complete Thm. 5.4 NP-complete Cor. 5.5
E -DUSB NP-complete Cor. 5.5 NP-complete Cor. 5.5
E -CWSB NP-complete Thm. 5.3 NP-complete Thm. 5.3
E -DWSB NP-complete Thm. 5.3 NP-complete Thm. 5.3
E -CUEB – P Thm. 5.8
E -DUEB – P Thm. 5.8
E -CWEB – NP-complete Thm. 5.7
E -DWEB – NP-complete Thm. 5.7
so-far-disapproved candidates (these new candidates are ranked below the previously-approved
candidates, but among themselves are ranked as the briber requests).
We define the following related problem.
FV-CONSTRUCTIVE UNWEIGHTED EXTENSION BRIBERY (FV-CUEB)
Given: A fallback election (C,V ), where V = (v1, . . . ,vn), a designated candidate p, a
list (δ1, . . . ,δn) of extension bribery price functions, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question: Can p be made the unique fallback winner by extending the approved parts of
the the voters’ ballots without exceeding the budget k?
Again, the weighted variant (E -CWEB) is defined in the natural way and so are the destructive
variants (E -DUEB and E -DWEB).
Table 8 summarizes the results of this section.
5.2 Results for Swap Bribery
We start by quickly observing that weighted swap bribery is NP-complete for both Bucklin and
fallback rules.
Theorem 5.3 BV-CWSB, BV-DWSB, FV-CWSB, and FV-DWSB are NP-complete.
Proof. The proof for Bucklin is a direct consequence of the fact that CWB-$ is NP-complete for
plurality, even for just two candidates [FHH09] (the result holds both for the uniqe-winner case and
for the nonunique-winner case). For two candidates, the Bucklin rule is identical to the plurality rule.
Further, for two candidates CWB-$ is, in essence, identical to CWSB (the only possible bribery is to
swap the only two candidates), and the nonunique-winner variant of CWB-$ is, in essence, identical
to DWSB.
For fallback, membership of the problems in NP is clear, and NP-hardness follows by the
same arguments as for Bucklin, by considering the setting where every voter approves of all candi-
dates. ❑
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For the unweighted case, NP-completeness of BV-CUSB follows immediately from the fact
that the possible winner problem for Bucklin is NP-complete (see the papers of Konczak and
Lang [KL05], for the definition of the possible winner problem, and of Xia and Conitzer [XC11],
for the result regarding Bucklin) and the fact that, for a given voting rule, the possible winner prob-
lem reduces to the swap bribery problem [EFS09]. However, on the one hand, the hardness of the
possible winner problem was established for the simplified variant of Bucklin’s rule only, and on
the other hand, we can show that BV-CUSB is NP-complete even for elections with just two voters.
Theorem 5.4 BV-CUSB is NP-complete, even for elections with two voters.
Proof. It is easy to see that BV-CUSB is in NP. We show NP-hardness by a reduction from
the following problem (which we will refer to as SINGLE-VOTE SWAP BRIBERY): Given a vote
v (expressed as a preference order over some candidate set C), a swap-bribery price function pi
for v, a designated candidate p ∈ C, and two nonnegative integers ℓ and k, is there a sequence of
swaps of adjacent candidates, of total cost at most k, that ensures that p is ranked among the top ℓ
positions in v. (Elkind et al. [EFS09] studied this problem as a variant of the swap bribery problem
for k-approval elections, where k is part of the input and the election consists of a single vote; they
established NP-completeness of the problem in their Theorem 6.)
Let I = (C,v,pi, p, ℓ,k) be an instance of SINGLE-VOTE SWAP BRIBERY. We form a Bucklin
election E = (A,V ) as follows. Let C′ be a collection of some ‖C‖−1 dummy candidates. We set
A =C∪C′∪{d}. We partition C′ into two sets, C′1 and C′2, such that ‖C′1‖= ℓ and ‖C′2‖= ‖C′‖− ℓ.
(We pick any easily computable partition.) We let V be a collection of two voters, v1 and v2, with
price functions pi1 and pi2:
1. v1 has preference order d > v >C′ (i.e., v1 ranks d on the top position, then all the candidates
from C in the same order as v, and then all the candidates from C′, in some arbitrary-but-
easy-to-compute order). For each two candidates x,y ∈ A, if both x and y are in C then we set
pi1(x,y) = pi(x,y), and otherwise we set pi1(x,y) = k+1.
2. v2 has preference order p >C′1 > d >C′2 >C−{p} (that is, v2 ranks p first, then ℓ candidates
from C′1 followed by d, followed by the remaining candidates from C′, and, then, followed by
the candidates from C−{p}). For each two candidates x,y ∈ A, we set pi2(x,y) = k+1.
Note that in our election maj(V ) = 2 and, if p is not among the top ℓ positions within v, d is a winner
with Bucklin score ℓ+ 2 (we cannot say that d is the unique winner because we do not know on
what position p is ranked in v). We claim that p can become a unique Bucklin winner of election E
through a swap bribery of cost at most k if and only if I is a yes-instance of SINGLE-VOTE SWAP
BRIBERY.
Assume that I is a yes-instance of SINGLE-VOTE SWAP BRIBERY. This means that there is a
sequence of swaps within v after which p is ranked among the top ℓ positions in v. Applying the
same swaps to v1 would cost the same and would put p among top ℓ+ 1 positions in v1, making p
the unique Bucklin winner.
On the other hand, assume that there is a cost-at-most-k sequence of swaps within V that make
p a unique Bucklin winner. Since any swap that is not in the v part of v1 costs k + 1, we have
that d’s Bucklin score is still ℓ+ 2, and, thus, after the swaps, p’s Bucklin score is in {2, . . . , ℓ+
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1}. Executing the same swaps within v shows that I is a yes-instance of SINGLE-VOTE SWAP
BRIBERY. ❑
To establish that BV-DUSB also is NP-complete for the case of two voters, it suffices to use
the same construction as above, with the exception that now (a) d is the designated candidate whose
victory we want to preclude, and (b) v2 ranks d on position ℓ+1 (and not ℓ+2). Analogous results
for the fallback rule follow immediately.
Corollary 5.5 BV-DUSB, FV-CUSB, and FV-DUSB are NP-complete even for the cases of two
voters.
5.3 Results for Extension Bribery
Let us now move on to the study of extension bribery. The following observation will simplify our
discussion.
Observation 5.6 In (constructive) extension bribery problems for the fallback rule it is never prof-
itable to extend any vote in any other way than by asking the voter to include the designated candi-
date on the last unranked position.
Thus we will often specify the extension bribery price functions by simply giving the cost of ex-
tending the vote by just one candidate (we will refer to this number as extension cost of the vote).
Not surprisingly, the weighted variants of extension bribery are NP-complete.
Theorem 5.7 Both FV-CWEB and FV-DWEB are NP-complete.
Proof. Obviously, FV-CWEB is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we use a reduction from PAR-
TITION. Let ({1, . . . ,k},(a1, . . . ,ak)) be an instance of PARTITION. We define a fallback election
(C,V ) with the candidate set C = {b,c, p}, the designated candidate p, and V consisting of the
following k+2 voters:
1. There is one voter v0 with the ballot p | {b,c}, with weight K +1 and extension cost K +1.
2. For each i,1 ≤ i≤ k, there is a voter vi who casts the ballot c | {b, p}, has weight wi = ai, and
has extension cost ai.
3. There is one voter vk+1 who casts the ballot b | {c, p} with weight 2K and extension cost
K +1.
The total sum of the voter’s weights in this election is 5K + 1, so maj(V ) > 2K. The weighted
scores of the candidates in (C,V ) are shown in Table 9(a). Both c and b are fallback winners in
(C,V ) and they win by approval, thus p is not a (unique) fallback winner in (C,V ).
We claim that there is a set A′ ⊆ A = {1, . . . ,k} such that ∑i∈A′ ai = ∑i6∈A′ ai = K if and only if p
can be made the unique fallback winner by extension-bribing some of the voters without exceeding
the budget K.
From left to right: Suppose that there is a set A′ ⊆ A such that ∑i∈A′ ai = ∑i6∈A′ ai = K. Change
the votes of those voters vi with i∈ A′ from c | {b, p} to c > p | {b}. Each of these changes costs ai,
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Table 9: Scores in the election constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.7
(a) Total scores in (C,V )
b c p
score1 2K 2K K +1
(b) Total scores in (C,V ′)
b c p
score1 2K 2K K +1
score2 2K 2K 2K +1
so the total cost is K. The candidates’ scores in the resulting election (C,V ′) are shown in Table 9(b).
We see that p is the unique fallback winner in the bribed election.
From right to left: Suppose that p is the unique fallback winner in the election (C,V ′), where V ′
is the changed voter set and the corresponding changes cost at most K. Hence, the only changes that
can be made (and that follow Observation 5.6) are adding the candidate p to the approval strategies
of some of the voters v1, . . . ,vk. The scores of the candidates b and c cannot be decreased, so p has
to gain K points to have strictly more points than b and c. Thus, there exists a set A′ ⊆ A such that
∑i∈A′ ai = ∑i6∈A′ ai = K and p has to be added to the approval strategies of those voters vi with i∈ A′.
The destructive case can be proven by changing the role of candidates p and c and changing the
weights of both v0 and vk+1 to K. ❑
On the other hand, the unweighted variant of the problem is in P. This is a nice complement
to the hardness results of Schlotter et al. [SFE11] regarding support bribery. The main difference
regarding support bribery and extension bribery is that under the former we assume the voters to
rank all the candidates but declare as approved only some of their top candidates, whereas in the
latter (and, in general, in our model) we assume the voters to rank only the approved candidates and
completely disregard the disapproved candidates.
Algorithm 4: Algorithm for Bucklin-CUEB
input : C set of candidates
V list of voters
∆ = (δ1, . . . ,δn) list of extension bribery price functions
k budget
p designated candidate
output: “YES” if (C,V,∆,k, p) ∈ fallback-CUEB
“NO” if (C,V,∆,k, p) /∈ fallback-CUEB
1 foreach s ∈ {1, . . . ,‖C‖} do
2 let (v′1, . . . ,v′r) be a sublist of V containing votes that approve at most s− 1 candidates and do not
approve c, sorted by extension costs in ascending order;
3 foreach t ∈ {0, . . . ,r} do
4 if changing v′1, . . .v′t to approve p makes p the unique winner then
5 if the sum of extension costs of v′1, . . . ,v′t is less thank k then
6 return “YES”;
7
8
9 return “NO”;
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Theorem 5.8 FV-CUEB and FV-DUEB are in P.
Proof. Let us consider FV-CUEB first. We claim that Algorithm 4 solves the problem in poly-
nomial time. The algorithm considers each round s in which p could possibly become the unique
winner and tries the cheapest bribery that might achieve it. The algorithm clearly runs in polynomial
time and its correctness follows by Observation 5.6.
It is clear how to adapt Algorithm 4 to the case of nonunique winners. Then, to solve the
destructive variant of the problem it suffices to check if any candidate other than p can be made a
nonunique winner within the budget. ❑
References
[BCE13] F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss. Computational social choice. In G. Weiß, editor,
Multiagent Systems, pages 213–283. MIT Press, second edition, 2013.
[BEH+10] D. Baumeister, G. Erde´lyi, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Compu-
tational aspects of approval voting. In J. Laslier and R. Sanver, editors, Handbook on
Approval Voting, chapter 10, pages 199–251. Springer, 2010.
[BF78] S. Brams and P. Fishburn. Approval voting. American Political Science Review,
72(3):831–847, 1978.
[BF83] S. Brams and P. Fishburn. Approval Voting. Birkha¨user, Boston, 1983.
[BFLR12] D. Baumeister, P. Faliszewski, J. Lang, and J. Rothe. Campaigns for lazy voters: Trun-
cated ballots. In Proceedings of the 11th International Joint Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 577–584. IFAAMAS, June 2012.
[BO91] J. Bartholdi III and J. Orlin. Single transferable vote resists strategic voting. Social
Choice and Welfare, 8(4):341–354, 1991.
[BS06] S. Brams and R. Sanver. Critical strategies under approval voting: Who gets ruled in
and ruled out. Electoral Studies, 25(2):287–305, 2006.
[BS09] S. Brams and R. Sanver. Voting systems that combine approval and preference. In
S. Brams, W. Gehrlein, and F. Roberts, editors, The Mathematics of Preference, Choice,
and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn, pages 215–237. Springer, 2009.
[BTT89] J. Bartholdi III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. The computational difficulty of manipulating
an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227–241, 1989.
[BTT92] J. Bartholdi III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. How hard is it to control an election? Mathe-
matical and Computer Modelling, 16(8/9):27–40, 1992.
[CSL07] V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. When are elections with few candidates hard to
manipulate? Journal of the ACM, 54(3):Article 14, 2007.
26
[DS12] B. Dorn and I. Schlotter. Multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery. Algorith-
mica, 64(1):126–151, 2012.
[EF10a] E. Elkind and P. Faliszewski. Approximation algorithms for campaign management. In
Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop On Internet And Network Economics,
pages 473–482. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science #6484, December
2010.
[EF10b] G. Erde´lyi and M. Fellows. Parameterized control complexity in Bucklin voting and
in fallback voting. In V. Conitzer and J. Rothe, editors, Proceedings of the 3rd In-
ternational Workshop on Computational Social Choice, pages 163–174. Universita¨t
Du¨sseldorf, September 2010.
[EFRS12] G. Erde´lyi, M. Fellows, J. Rothe, and L. Schend. Control complexity in Bucklin and fall-
back voting. Technical Report arXiv:1103.2230 [cs.CC], Computing Research Repos-
itory, arXiv.org/corr/, March 2012. March, 2011. Revised August, 2012. Extends the
AAMAS-2011 paper [EPR11].
[EFS09] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko. Swap bribery. In Proceedings of the 2nd In-
ternational Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 299–310. Springer-Verlag
Lecture Notes in Computer Science #5814, October 2009.
[ENR09] G. Erde´lyi, M. Nowak, and J. Rothe. Sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting
fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control. Mathematical
Logic Quarterly, 55(4):425–443, 2009.
[EPR11] G. Erde´lyi, L. Piras, and J. Rothe. The complexity of voter partition in Bucklin and
fallback voting: Solving three open problems. In Proceedings of the 10th Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 837–844.
IFAAMAS, May 2011.
[ER10] G. Erde´lyi and J. Rothe. Control complexity in fallback voting. In Proceedings of
Computing: the 16th Australasian Theory Symposium, pages 39–48. Australian Com-
puter Society Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology Series,
vol. 32, no. 8, January 2010.
[FHH09] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. How hard is bribery in elec-
tions? Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 35:485–532, 2009.
[FHHR09] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Llull and Copeland
voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control. Journal of Artificial
Intelligence Research, 35:275–341, 2009.
[FP10] P. Faliszewski and A. Procaccia. AI’s war on manipulation: Are we winning? AI
Magazine, 31(4):53–64, 2010.
[GJ79] M. Garey and D. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of
NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979.
27
[HHR07] E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Anyone but him: The complexity
of precluding an alternative. Artificial Intelligence, 171(5–6):255–285, 2007.
[KL05] K. Konczak and J. Lang. Voting procedures with incomplete preferences. In Proceed-
ings of the Multidisciplinary IJCAI-05 Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling,
pages 124–129, July/August 2005.
[Men11] C. Menton. Normalized range voting broadly resists control. Technical Report
arXiv:1005.5698v2 [cs.GT], Computing Research Repository, arXiv.org/corr/, April
2011. Revised June, 2012. To appear in Theory of Computing Systems.
[Pap95] C. Papadimitriou. Computational Complexity. Addison-Wesley, second edition, 1995.
[Rot05] J. Rothe. Complexity Theory and Cryptology. An Introduction to Cryptocomplexity.
EATCS Texts in Theoretical Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[RS] J. Rothe and L. Schend. Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to pro-
tect elections against manipulation and control: A survey. Annals of Mathematics and
Artificial Intelligence. To appear.
[RS12] J. Rothe and L. Schend. Control complexity in Bucklin, fallback, and plurality voting:
An experimental approach. In Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on
Experimental Algorithms, pages 356–368. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer
Science #7276, June 2012.
[SFE11] I. Schlotter, P. Faliszewski, and E. Elkind. Campaign management under approval-
driven voting rules. In Proceedings of the 25th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, pages 726–731, August 2011.
[XC11] L. Xia and V. Conitzer. Determining possible and necessary winners given partial or-
ders. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 41:25–67, 2011.
[Xia12] L. Xia. Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules. In Proceedings of the
13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 982–999. ACM Press, 2012.
[XZP+09] L. Xia, M. Zuckerman, A. Procaccia, V. Conitzer, and J. Rosenschein. Complexity of
unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules. In Proceedings
of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 348–353.
IJCAI, July 2009.
28
